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 1 
REASONS AND CAUSES: THE PHILOSOPHICAL BATTLE AND THE 
METAPHILOSOPHICAL WAR 
 
Introduction 
Since the publication of Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons and Causes”1 the 
philosophy of action has been dominated by the view that rational 
explanations are a species of causal explanations. Although there are 
dissenting voices,2 anti-causalism is for the most part associated with a 
position that tended to be defended in the 1960s and that was successfully 
buried by Davidson’s criticism of the logical connection argument. In the 
following I argue that the success of causalism cannot be fully accounted for 
by considering the outcome of first-order debates in the philosophy of action 
and that it is to be explained instead by a shift in meta-philosophical 
assumptions. It is the commitment to a certain second-order view of the role 
and character of philosophical analysis, rather than the conclusive nature of 
the arguments for causalism, that is largely responsible for the rise of the 
recent causalist consensus. I characterise the change in meta-philosophical 
assumptions in Strawsonian terms as a change from a descriptive to a 
revisionary conception of metaphysics and argue that since the disagreement 
between causalists and non-causalists cannot be settled at the level of first-
order debates, causalists cannot win the philosophical battle against anti-
causalists without fighting the meta-philosophical war. 
 
Descriptive metaphysics and the action/event distinction 
Strawson identified two fundamental features of descriptive metaphysics. 
First, descriptive metaphysics describes our conceptual scheme, and is a 
conceptual, not an ontological enquiry. Secondly, the fundamental categories 
of descriptive metaphysics are conceptually invariant because they capture 
some of the most fundamental judgments we make. As Strawson put it, the 
task of philosophy is to 
                                                 
1
 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963, pp. 685-700. 
2
 See Tanney, J. "Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind", Ratio, vol. XVIII, pp. 
338-351, 2005  and "Why Reasons May Not Be Causes", Mind & Language, vol. 10, pp. 103-
126, 1995;  Hutto, D., “A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59, 1999, pp. 381–401; Sehon, S.,  
Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, 2005. MIT Press, 2005. 
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“lay bare the most general features of our conceptual scheme… a 
massive central core of human thinking which has no history… the 
commonplaces of the least refined thinking… the indispensable core of 
the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human being.”3 
 
Revisionary metaphysics, by contrast, is concerned with existential structures 
and the goal of revisionary metaphysics is to challenge and alter our 
conception of what there is. Thus, as a revisionary metaphysician, Descartes 
sought to alter the common sense conception of reality as made up of 
macroscopic objects and show that what really exist are what would later be 
called primary properties such as size, extension, motion or rest etc. As a 
descriptive metaphysician, by contrast, Kant sought to defend the 
consupponibility of theoretical and moral judgements rather than demand that 
we revise our common sense belief in the possibility of moral action in line 
with the demands of the theoretical standpoint. These different conceptions of 
metaphysics, as a descriptive and revisionary science respectively, underpin 
very different ways of understanding the nature of the action/event distinction. 
For in the former case the task of philosophy is to provide a justification for the 
distinction between practical and theoretical claims, whilst in the latter case 
the task of philosophy is to discover what are the real relations holding 
amongst particulars, not to construct a metaphysics around the common 
sense distinction between (moral) actions and (natural) events. In the 
following I intend to use the Strawsonian distinction between descriptive and 
revisionary metaphysics to show how a commitment to these different 
conceptions of the role and character of philosophical analysis underpins very 
different views of what it means to draw a distinction between the concepts of 
action and of event.  
The defence of the autonomy of action explanation from event 
explanation that was articulated in the philosophy of action during the 1960s 
was arguably underpinned by a conception of metaphysics as a descriptive 
science. Many 1960s non-reductivists were united in the view that the 
                                                 
3
 Strawson, P.F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1959, p. 10. 
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 3 
explanation of actions differs in kind from the explanation of events and that 
rational explanations are a species of justification, not of causal explanations.4 
This non-reductivism was grounded in the view that there is a different kind of 
connection holding between the explanans and the explanandum in action 
and event explanations. In event explanation the connection between the 
explanans and the explanandum is an empirical connection that is established 
through observation and inductive generalisation; in the case of action 
explanation, on the other hand, the connection between the explanans and 
the explanandum is conceptual or rational.5 Whilst one may say that an agent 
acted in a particular way on account of certain beliefs and desires of hers, 
such beliefs and desires do not explain the action in the manner in which the 
dropping of the temperature below 0°C explains the cracking of the radiator in 
a car left out on a freezing cold night.6 For beliefs and desires explain action 
in so far as they feature as epistemic and motivational premises in practical 
arguments that are ascribed to agents in order to make sense of what they 
do. As premises in practical arguments beliefs and desires do their 
explanatory work not as antecedent conditions of an inner nature, such as 
brain states, but rather as propositional contents. It is the propositional 
content of beliefs and desires ascribed to an agent that explains their actions 
as the rational conclusion of a train of thought. It is precisely because 1960s 
non-reductivists held that to explain action is to understand it as the 
conclusion of a practical argument, that they claimed the explanation of action 
to be a species of justification, not of causal explanation. Action explanations 
are a species of justification because to understand something as the rational 
thing to do, is to understand why one ought to have inferred a conclusion from 
certain epistemic and motivational premises. The normativity at work in action 
explanations was deemed to be of a purely instrumental kind because what is 
                                                 
4
 Melden, A. I., Free Action, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, Von Wright, G. H., 
Explanation and Understanding, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971, Wittgenstein, L. 
Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953 and The Blue and Brown Books, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. 
5
 See Dray, W. H. (1957). Laws and Explanations in History, London: Oxford University Press, 
1957 and “The Historical Explanation of Action Reconsidered”, in S. Hook (ed.). Philosophy 
and History, New York: New York University Press, 1963.   
6
 The example was used by Hempel to illustrate the structure of scientific explanation. See 
Hempel, C. “The function of general laws in history” Journal of Philosophy 39, 1942, pp. 35-
48. 
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 4 
at stake in the explanation of action is neither the truth value of the epistemic 
premises (are the beliefs of the agents true/false?) nor the moral status of 
what they desire (are the agent’s goals morally acceptable/reprehensible?) 
but the validity of the inference from premises to conclusion.7 1960s non-
reductivists thus rejected the view that beliefs and desires are internal causes 
of action on the grounds that the relation one tries to establish when 
explaining an action is conceptual or rational, not empirical. This view was 
canvassed by W. H. Dray who argued against Hempel’s revival of Mill’s claim8 
that action explanations are a species of nomological explanations that differ 
from the explanation of events only on account of their poor predictive power. 
The Millian and Hempelian view simply missed the point that action 
explanations are normative and that even in those cases in which practical 
arguments are used predictively (in order to anticipate what an agent might do 
in the future), rather than retrospectively (to explain why they acted as they 
did in the past), anticipations based on practical arguments rely on 
expectations of how rational agents ought to act in response to norms of 
instrumental reasoning, not on expectations of how they will act based on 
empirical generalisations. Even when directed towards the future, action 
explanations are not inductively based generalizations premised upon the 
principle of the uniformity of nature. The Millian and Hempelian view takes the 
                                                 
7
 The account of action explanation defended by 1960s non-reductivists is Humean in the 
sense that the interpreter need not assume that agents desire something only under an 
aspect of the good or sub specie boni. In this respect the notion of normativity at work here is 
much weaker than that defended by philosophers who endorse an Aristotelian account of 
practical reasoning, such as Maria Alvarez (See her Kinds of Reasons: an essay in the 
philosophy of action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  But their defence of the 
autonomy of action explanation is not Humean in the sense that is most relevant to a 
discussion of the autonomy of action explanations because they denied that the explanans 
(belief and desire pairs) and the explanandum (the action) are spatio-temporally distinct 
events and asserted instead that the connection between an action and the reasons which 
explain it is conceptual or rational. Further this account of action explanation is not 
psychologistic because beliefs and desires do their explanatory work as premises in practical 
arguments that are ascribed to the agent by the interpreter in order to make sense of their 
actions, not qua psychological states of agents (i.e. qua believings and desiring). 1960s non-
reductivists explicitly denied that agents need to consciously recite a practical argument in 
order to be deemed to be acting. But by the same token, this account is not externalist (like 
the one defended by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) because the facts cited in the explanation of action (e.g. she took the umbrella because 
it was raining) do their explanatory work as epistemic premises, not as empirical facts. 1960s 
non-reductivism allowed for the possibility that unsound but valid practical arguments could 
be genuinely explanatory precisely because propositions, unlike facts, can be true or false.  
8
 See J. S. Mill, System of logic: ratiocinative and inductive. In Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963-1991 [1843]). 
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 5 
fact that rational explanations can be put to the same use as causal 
explanations (that they can be used predictively) to imply that they are not 
different in kind from causal explanations. But action explanations are 
rationalizations whether they are offered as ex post facto explanations of past 
actions or as anticipations of future ones. The use to which action 
explanations are put does not change their logical structure. Action 
explanations are rationalizations (they are normative rather than nomological) 
whether they are applied to the past or to the future. 
In fact, for 1960s non-reductivists such as Dray the folk-psychological 
view that actions and events belong to different ontological categories could 
be vindicated only on the assumption that there is a difference in kind 
between causal and rational explanations and that the latter are not merely a 
species of the former. For if rationalizations were a species of causal 
explanations then the relation holding between actions and events would be 
rather like the one holding between a species and its kind, between, say, 
Siamese cats and cats in general. And this understanding of the relation is far 
too weak to support the widely held common sense view that agents are free 
to disregard rational considerations. Vindicating the folk-psychological 
distinction between things which happen and things agents do requires 
understanding actions as responses to rational norms (even if only norms of 
instrumental reasoning) since norms prescribe how one ought to act in 
response to commands or imperatives, rather than determine what will 
happen in conformity to causal laws.  From Dray’s perspective, not only does 
the covering law model miss the point of action explanation, which is to 
understand or clarify in the hermeneutic sense. It also fails to vindicate the 
common sense distinction between actions and events. For such a distinction 
implies that the concept of action is a logically independent genus, not a 
species of the genus “event”.9 
Since 1960s non-reductivists such as Dray took the logical forms of 
rational and causal explanations to be implicit in the folk-psychological 
distinction between actions and events, they saw themselves as being 
engaged not in the task of revising, but in that of corroborating common sense 
                                                 
9
 For a defence of the view that actions and events are logically independent gena see Carlos 
Moya, The Philosophy of Action: an introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, chapter 1. 
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 6 
ontological categories. They worked in the manner of descriptive 
metaphysicians because they proceeded regressively from the fact that 
certain distinctions are made to the condition of their possibility. In their view, 
to vindicate the folk-psychological distinction between actions and events 
required no less and no more than making explicit the hidden semantic 
implicature holding between rational explanation and the concept of action on 
the one hand and causal explanations and the concept of event on the other. 
This vindication consisted in showing not that the distinction between actions 
and events is possible, but rather, given that it is made, how it is possible. And 
to show how the distinction is possible, rather than showing that it is possible, 
does not require going beyond the way in which we think and speak about the 
world. On the contrary, such a task presupposes precisely that there is no 
non-circular relation holding between method and subject matter, one’s 
explanatory goals and the nature of one’s ontological categories. Since, on 
this account, the distinction between actions and events is made possible by 
the employment of different forms of judgment (rational and causal judgments 
respectively), it follows that the expressions “rational explanation” and “causal 
explanation” are short hand respectively for “rational explanation of actions” 
and “causal explanation of events”. 
A number of important implications follow from the ways in which 
1960s non-reductivists articulated the argument for the autonomy of action 
explanation. First, since actions are explained rationally and events are 
explained causally, and since rational explanations appeal to normative 
considerations that agents may disregard, actions and events are not 
descriptions than can be conjoined or listed alongside one another. Whilst we 
may say that something is both yellow and square, we cannot coherently 
describe something as being both an action and an event because to do so 
would be tantamount to claiming that it is both rationally motivated and 
causally determined. Secondly, whilst it is not possible, for the reasons just 
given, to conjoin actions and events in one and the same description, there is 
no conflict between rational and causal explanation because, as reflection on 
the semantic implicature holding between method and subject matter reveals, 
rational and causal explanations have a different explanandum. Rational and 
causal explanations appear to conflict only in so far as the implicature holding 
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 7 
between a judgment and its corresponding ontological category is not properly 
grasped. Thus for example, whilst it may look as if a physician’s and a political 
historian’s explanation of Alexander Litvinenko’s death are competing with 
one another, such conflict arises only to the extent that one assumes that the 
physician and the political historian mean the same thing when they speak 
about “Litvinenko’s death”. But this is not the case, for by “Litvinenko’s death” 
the physician means the causal consequence of a physiological phenomenon, 
such as the failure of a vital organ, whilst by “Litvinenko’s death” the political 
historian means the preventable consequence of political conspiracy which 
led to his poisoning. Once the explanandum is sufficiently disambiguated it is 
clear that the physician and the historian are concerned with different things. 
The view that there is a conflict between their respective explanations arises 
only if one assumes that there is a sense of “thing” which is independent of 
the explanatory goals of medical science and of political history. But the very 
idea that one could identify an explanandum independently of the goals of a 
particular form of enquiry would have been anathema to 1960s style non-
reductivists for their form of non-reductivism was articulated against the 
backdrop of a descriptive conception of metaphysics which denied the 
existence of a non-circular relation holding between the explanans and the 
explanandum. The expressions “causal explanation” and “rational 
explanation”, as we have seen, are truncated forms of “causal explanation of 
events” and “rational explanation of actions”.  
1960s style non-reductivists were thus descriptive metaphysicians 
intent on explaining both the incompatibility and the consupponibility of 
practical and theoretical judgments. Explanations of actions and of events are 
incompatible because they imply freedom and determinism respectively. They 
are consupponible because they do not refer to the same (category neutral) 
“thing”. And since within a descriptive conception of metaphysics there is no 
category neutral description, there is no causal rivalry between folk-
psychological explanations (of actions) and scientific explanations (of events). 
The commitment to a particular conception of the task of philosophical 
enquiry was not explicitly at the forefront of the debate between reductivists 
and non-reductivists, but it was nonetheless lurking in the background of this 
dispute. Both non-reductivists such as Dray and reductivists such as Hempel 
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 8 
assumed the reasons/causes debate to be methodological in nature. What 
Hempel tried to show was that action explanations are methodologically 
reducible to the causal explanation of events, whilst Dray argued no such 
methodological reduction to be possible. But that the problem was 
methodological in the first instance was an assumption shared by reductivists 
and non-reductivists alike. Thus for the generation of non-reductivists prior to 
Davidson, once the relevant differences between the explanatory practices of 
the human and natural sciences had been pointed out, there were no residual 
questions to be addressed about how can mind fit in the natural world.10 
Questions such as, “how can reasons, which at best rationally necessitate the 
conclusion of a practical argument, be causally responsible for the occurrence 
of the event/bodily movement which we describe as an action?” are ill formed 
because they mix and match categories and forms of inference in an 
inadmissible way. There simply is no such thing as a causal explanation of 
action because to explain an action is to explain it rationally and to explain an 
event is to explain it causally. To ask the question “how can beliefs and 
desires cause actions?” is simply to have failed to grasp the concept of an 
action. Within the context of this essentially methodological debate the 
attempt to defend the autonomy of action explanations simply required 
showing that they are rational, not nomological, and failure to accomplish a 
methodological reduction was failure to accomplish any reduction tout court. 
 
Davidson’s master argument 
Why did the anti-causalist views that dominated in the 1960s fall into 
disrepute? The official story is that anti-causalism was successfully disposed 
of by Davidson, who offered a knockout argument for disconnecting non-
reductivism from anti-causalism.  
Davidson agreed with the previous generation of non-reductivists that 
action explanations are normative but he also argued that a defence of the 
autonomy of action explanations must be disconnected from a rejection of 
causalism. There is a distinction, Davidson argued, between mere 
                                                 
10
 How does mind fit in the natural world is on the other hand the central question of the 
philosophy of mind according to philosophers such as J. Kim, as the tiltle of his book Mind in 
a Physical World , suggests (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). 
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 9 
rationalizations or reasons for acting in a particular way, and rationalisations 
which form part of the agent’s process of deliberation leading to action, or the 
reasons why the agent acts. Suppose that on returning home a person (Sally) 
switches the light on. Sally could have switched the light on to alert a burglar 
in her property. Or she could have switched on the light to illuminate the room. 
Both reasons justify the action but Sally acted only on one of those reasons. 
Davidson argues that the causalist can easily account for the distinction 
between the reasons on which Sally acted (let’s call these reasons why) and 
other reasons on which Sally could have acted (let’s call these reasons for) by 
identifying the reasons why the agent acts with the reasons that are causally 
responsible for her acting.11 But such a distinction is not available to the kind 
of non-reductivist who is also an anti-causalist. Consequently, the previous 
generation of non-reductivists was unable to distinguish the reasons why an 
agent acts from mere reasons for acting. The inability to make such a 
distinction provides the motivation for disconnecting non-reductivism from 
anti-causalism. 
Davidson’s claim that the reasons why an agent acts are the causes of 
her actions marks a genuine departure from the way in which previous 
generations of non-reductivists had argued. What was assumed prior to 
Davidson is that the ascription of a practical argument to an agent must 
conform to public and intersubjectively valid criteria of what could count as 
reason-giving and that even first person reports must conform to these 
standards if they are to be accepted as explanatory in the relevant sense of 
“explanatory”. For that generation of non-reductivists, as we have seen, 
beliefs and desires explain actions not in so far as they fulfil the role of 
hidden/internal causes of external/observable bodily movements but in so far 
as they feature as premises in practical arguments. Explaining an action 
requires initiating a search for beliefs and desires with the appropriate 
propositional contents to act as premises in a practical syllogism. Establishing 
rational harmony between premises and conclusions does not require any 
insight into the inner world of the agent. The question to be asked is “why 
anyone who is presumed to be rational (in the minimal instrumental sense) 
                                                 
11
 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963, pp. 685-700. 
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 10 
would act in such and such a way?” To pinpoint the reasons that motivated 
the agent (the reasons why) amidst the array of valid practical arguments 
which could justify (instrumentally justify) the action, requires taking into 
account the specific circumstances in which the agent acted, including her 
beliefs and desires. But taking into account the perspective of the agent is 
simply a matter of determining which amongst the array of available valid 
practical argument it makes sense to ascribe to an agent, not to discover a 
secret causal connection between a brain state and a bodily movement. For 
1960s style n n-reductivists, altering the logical structure of action explanation 
in order to account for the distinction between reasons why and reasons for 
exacted too high a price, a price they were not willing to pay. For if beliefs and 
desires were internal causes of external bodily movements, then the folk-
psychological distinction between actions and events would be a mere 
mistake premised on a failure to grasp the entailment relations holding 
between the species (action) and the genus (event), just as the act of 
counting washing machines alongside electrical appliances is based on the 
failure to discern the entailment relation holding between the species 
(washing machine) and its genus (electrical appliances).  
Given that Davidson’s solution exacts such a high price, the question 
must be asked: is it really necessary, as Davidson argues, to identify the 
reasons why an agent acts with the causes of her action in order to provide 
explanations that are agent-centered? Arguably not. Scott Sehon has recently 
suggested that what is required in order to distinguish reasons why from 
reasons for is an appeal to counterfactuals: “agents act in ways that are 
appropriate for achieving their goals, given the agents’ circumstances, 
epistemic situations, and intentional states… this means that a wide variety of 
counterfactual conditions will hold of an agent.”12 He gives the following 
example: “suppose that Sally is faced with a sad situation: Her elderly father is 
terminally ill and comatose, and the doctors say there is no hope he will ever 
revive. He can be kept alive with machines, or Sally can decide to end the life 
support and he will die naturally. Sally desires that her father be allowed to die 
with dignity, and she believes that withdrawing life support will allow him to do 
                                                 
12
 Sehon, S., Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, 2005. MIT Press, 2005, p. 
157. 
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that. At the same time Sally wants to buy a new boat, and she will be able to 
do that if she pulls the plug on her father, for she will then be relieved of the 
enormous hospital bills.”13 Sehon argues that the following counterfactual 
conditionals holds: if Sally withdrew the life support because she wanted her 
father to die with dignity she would have acted in the same way even if her 
financial position would not have altered as a result of taking that decision.  
The problem one faces in determining the reasons why Sally acted 
may be usefully compared to the question: how do we know that a person 
acted out of duty rather than from some other non-moral motive? Kant 
suggested that we have such epistemic certainty in cases in which all 
empirical incentives are removed and a person still acts as duty requires. In 
such cases it is possible to say with certainty that an action was motivated by 
duty, and is not merely in accordance with duty. One might of course point out 
that unlike hypothetical scenarios, real life situations are ambiguous and that 
an agent’s actions are compatible with a plurality of rationalizations. But even 
if we grant that is hard to know whether an agent really acted out of duty, the 
epistemic difficulties that stand in the way of ascertaining what an agent’s true 
motives are should not be allowed to undermine the distinction between 
acting out of duty and acting in accordance with duty. For this distinction is an 
intensional distinction that is independent of the ability to determine, with 
absolute certainty, the extension of such concepts. In fact, one might argue 
that mastery of the conceptual distinction is logically required in order for 
those epistemic claims to be made in the first instance. By the same token, 
the fact that appeal to counterfactuals may not always conclusively show that 
a person acted on certain reasons rather than others, provides no 
argumentative basis for denying that the distinction between reasons and 
causes is a distinction in kind between logically independent genera rather 
than a distinction in degree between a species and its genus. So even if 
appeal to counterfactuals failed conclusively to establish the reasons why an 
agent acts, this affords no basis for undermining the distinction between 
reasons and causes, because such a distinction explicates what we mean 
when we speak about actions and about events just as Kant’s distinction 
                                                 
13
 Sehon, S., Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation, 2005. MIT Press, 2005, p. 
157. 
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 12 
between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of duty is not an 
attempt to determine the extension of such concepts by establishing who is 
pure of heart and who is not, but an attempt to explicate what we mean by 
moral action.  
An argument similar to Sehon has been developed by Julia Tanney. 
She suggests that to identify the reasons why an agent acts requires 
calibrating practical arguments in the light of additional information about the 
agent and the circumstances of their action rather than taking the draconian 
step of altering the logical structure of action explanation in order to account 
for the distinction between the reasons which motivated the agent from more 
generic reasons for acting.14 Tanney15 considers the case of a woman running 
out of a building. Her action could be rationalized by stating that the woman 
ran out of the building because the building was on fire. This would be short 
hand for “the woman believed the building was on fire, she wanted to stay 
alive and therefore she exited the building”. This rationalization, however, may 
provide a reason for running out of the building and yet not be the woman’s 
reason for doing so, because the woman is a fire fighter. In this case the initial 
rationalization will not do and one will have to look for another one. The 
woman may have run out to fetch a ladder to rescue an occupant trapped on 
the roof. Which is to say “the woman wanted to save a person trapped on the 
top floor of a burning building and since she believed that she could not have 
done this without fetching a ladder she left the burning building”.  But talk of 
the woman’s wants and beliefs is in the second case, as in the first, an 
attempt to make sense of her action by establishing a relation of rational fit 
between the premises and conclusions of a practical argument. It is not a 
                                                 
14
 This distinction is sometimes referred to as the distinction between normative and 
motivating reasons. But couching the distinction in this way is misleading in so far as it 
suggests that motivating reasons may not be normative. This is certainly not the view held by 
1960s non-reductivists who claimed rational explanations to be species of justification. 
Though, as we have seen the normativity at stake was minimal as it required neither that 
agents can desire an object only under an aspect of the good nor that in order to be 
normative arguments must be sound or have true premises. For the goal is to establish 
whether a particular course of action would be mandatory not in the absolute but in the light of 
the agent’s epistemic situation and of their preferences. 
15
 See Tanney, J. "Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind", Ratio, vol. XVIII, 2005, 
pp. 338-351. 
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question of “homing in something inner or hidden”16 that is accessible from the 
first person perspective only. Describing an action from an agent’s point of 
view requires altering the premises of the practical argument in the light of 
what we know about the circumstances of an agent, but in trying to discover 
what reasons might have motivated the agent to act we do not change the 
nature of the activity in which we are engaged. What we do is to construct 
multiple practical arguments with different beliefs and desires as epistemic 
and motivational premises and different actions as their conclusions.  
Tanney’s example of the woman fleeing from the building shows that 
different practical arguments support different explanations of an action and 
we choose from amongst these on the basis of our knowledge of the agent’s 
circumstances, including beliefs that it seems plausible to ascribe to them. We 
can rule out that what would normally count as a reason for fleeing the 
building (that it was on fire) was not the reason why the woman fled the 
building if we ascribe her the goal of saving lives in her role as a fire-fighter. 
But what we cannot do is to give up on the idea that there must be a rational 
fit between the epistemic and motivational premises and the action. And this 
is clear from the fact that if, when consulted, the woman suggested that she 
fled the building because she believed there are Martians on the moon, we 
could not accept her statement as an explanation of her action even if it may 
be truthful to her psychological processes. The epistemic consideration that 
agents have greater authority over the narrative which explains their actions 
should not be allowed neither to override the conceptual point that action 
explanations are normative nor to blur the distinction between logic and 
psychology.  
A solution to a problem must be proportionate to the problem it tries to 
solve but Davidson’s proposal to draw the distinction between reasons why 
and reasons for by identifying the reasons why an agent acts with the causes 
of her actions uses a sledgehammer to crack a nut. For such a distinction 
could be drawn without severing the link between non-reductism and non-
causalism. If it is possible to draw the distinction between reasons why and 
reasons for by considering different logical antecedents (things that the agent 
                                                 
16
 See Tanney, J. "Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind", Ratio, vol. XVIII, 2005, 
p. 341. 
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was/was not likely to know/believe, things that the agent was/was not likely to 
desire) there is no need to take the momentous step of altering the logical 
structure of action explanation in order to account for the distinction.  
 
The unofficial story about the rise of the new causalist consensus 
While Davidson’s argument is not conclusive, it was largely responsible for 
establishing a new causalist consensus. For after Davidson’s seminal essay 
what was far from obvious in the 1960s suddenly became obvious in the 
1970s. It is uncontroversial to Fodor, for example, that the folk-psychological 
view of action is causal: 
 
… if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my 
reaching… and my believing is causally responsible for my saying…, if 
none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about 
anything is false and it’s the end of the world.17 
 
Remarks such as these would not have appeared obvious to philosophers 
such as Dray, who took a rather different view of the nature of the folk-
psychological explanations of action. Dray would have claimed that what the 
ordinary folk does is to make a distinction between actions and events, but 
that it is the task of the philosopher to decide whether the folk-psychological 
distinction between actions and events is just a difference in degree between 
explanations whose causes are internal and those whose causes are external 
or whether it is a difference in kind between causal and rational explanations. 
Whilst Dray began from an examination of the common sense claim that 
person S did x because they believed y, he did not assume common sense to 
have a prior commitment to causalism.18 So why is it that what was not 
obvious prior to the publication of Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, 
became obvious afterwards? Arguably what is obvious to Fodor is not obvious 
to Dray’s because Dray’s argument against methodological unity in the 
sciences was largely an attempt to present, in the idiom of analytic 
                                                 
17
 Fodor, J., A Theory of Content and Other Essays, MIT Press, p. 156 
18
 On this point see Hutto, D., “Presumptuous Naturalism: a cautionary tale”, forthcoming in 
American Philosophical Quarterly. 
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 15 
philosophy, a defence of the autonomy of the human sciences inspired by 
Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics as a science of absolute 
presuppositions. Since Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics as a 
descriptive rather than revisionary enterprise provided the backdrop against 
which Dray’s defence of anti-causalism was articulated, it is worth spelling it 
out in some detail. 
According to Collingwood, the practitioners of different sciences 
absolutely presuppose different conceptions of causation that match up with 
the nature of their subject-specific explanandum. Historians are committed to 
what Collingwood refers to as “sense I” of the term “cause”. In history “that 
which is caused is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible 
agent, and causing him to do it means affording him a motive for so doing.”19 
The word is used in this sense in expressions such as “Mr Baldwin’s speech 
compelled the speaker to adjourn the house” or “a solicitor’s letter causes a 
man to pay his debt”. Sense I captures Collingwood view that history is a 
hermeneutic science concerned with the understanding of action. The term 
cause has a different meaning in the practical sciences of nature, sciences 
such as medicine and engineering. In the practical sciences of nature the term 
cause is used in “sense II” to mean “an event or state of things by producing 
or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to 
be”.20 For a medical practitioner the bite of a mosquito would qualify as a 
possible cause (in sense II) of malaria, for the primary concern of the medical 
doctor is to prevent or cure diseases. The term cause has a different meaning 
(“sense III”) in the theoretical sciences of nature where the term cause 
signifies an “event or state of things such that (a) if the cause happens or 
exists, the effect must happen or exist even if no further conditions are fulfilled 
(b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause happens or exists.”21 
The term “cause” acquires this deterministic meaning in sciences such as 
physics, which abstract from human interests in the manipulation of nature. 
The presupposition that the cause (sense I) of an action is the motive which 
explains it, is analytic for the historian because actions are the subject matter 
                                                 
19
 Collingwood, R.G., An Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 285. 
20
 Collingwood, R.G., An Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 296-7. 
21
 Collingwood, R.G., An Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 285-6. 
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of history. By the same token, that the cause (sense II) of an event is a state 
of affairs that may be either produced or prevented by human intervention is 
analytic for the practical sciences of nature. Absolute presuppositions thus 
express conceptual truths which cannot be denied without questioning the 
form of enquiry which presupposes them. These different conceptions of 
causation supply the verification conditions at work in different domains of 
enquiry. Causation, for Collingwood, is thus not a real relation but a form of 
explanation that is absolutely presupposed by a practitioner of a science and 
which supplies the verification conditions at work in a given domain of enquiry. 
Since there are no true or false claims that can be made independently of the 
verification conditions at work in a particular domain of enquiry, no form of 
explanation wears the ontological trousers precisely because all senses of 
causation capture explanatory, not real relations. There is no problem of 
explanatory exclusion precisely because it is not possible to break through the 
analytic entailment that holds between the explanandum and its explanans. 
In so far as Dray’s defence of the autonomy of action explanation was 
articulated against the background of a descriptive conception of 
metaphysics, Dray’s anti-causalism had two distinctive features. Firstly, it 
rejected the view that the concept of explanation is a monolithic concept and 
that causal explanation (which was standardly identified with nomological 
explanation) is the only kind of explanation. This was the main bone of 
contention between Dray and Hempel. Secondly, it rejected the view that 
causation is a real or extensional relation that holds amongst events 
independently of how they are identified within a given explanatory context. 
This is a view defended by Davidson as part of an attempt to clarify the nature 
of his Anomalous Monism.22 Whilst Davidson sided with Dray and against 
Hempel on the normative character of action explanation, unlike Dray he 
believed causation to be more than a form of explanation.  
Dray rejected the view that there is more to causation than causal 
explanation because he developed his defence of the autonomy of action 
explanation against the backdrop of a descriptive conception of metaphysics. 
                                                 
22
 Davidson, D., (1970), “Mental Events,” in Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 207-25.  
Davidson’s explicit statement concerning the extensional nature of the causal relation is to be 
found in his “Thinking Causes” in Truth, Language, and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2005), pp.188-9. 
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Accepting this descriptive conception of metaphysics implied that the task of 
the philosopher is to make explicit the presuppositions at work in different 
explanatory practices, not to solve the problem of mental causation. The 
fundamental problem of the philosophy of mind and action after Davidson, the 
problem of how can mind make an impact onto the physical world, arises only 
against the backdrop of a revisionary conception of metaphysics that was 
alien both to Dray and to many other 1960s style non-reductivists. It is only if 
the term causation is taken to be a category of revisionary metaphysics 
denoting a real relation holding amongst events independently of how they 
are described, that the problem of causal rivalry between folk-psychological 
explanations of actions and naturalistic explanation of events can arise. The 
problem of explanatory exclusion simply does not arise within a descriptive 
conception of metaphysics precisely because within such a conception of the 
role and character of philosophical analysis causal relations are intensional 
relations that are not logically independent of the explanatory goal of a 
science. 
It is this extensional view of the causal relation that has resonated with 
Davidson’s supporters who were quick to identify Davidson’s extensionalism 
about causation with a rejection of a meta-philosophical view that had 
underpinned the non-reductivism of the 1960s. E. Lepore and B. Lower, for 
example, have pooh-poohed 1960s style anti-causalism as exemplifying the 
views which dominated in the era of ‘little red books’: 
 
During the heyday of neo-Wittgenstenian and Rylean philosophy of 
mind, the era of little red books, it was said that propositional 
attitude explanations are not causal explanations and that beliefs, 
intendings, imaginings, and the like are not even candidates to be 
causes. Indeed, to treat mentalistic language as describing causes 
or causal processes is, it was said, a logical error. We have come a 
long way since then. The work of Davidson, Armstrong, Putnam, 
and Fodor (among others) has reversed what was once the 
orthodoxy and it is now widely agreed that propositional attitude 
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attributions describe states and episodes which enter into causal 
relations.23 
 
And Kim has accused methodological non-reductivists of evading the real 
(and in his view ontological) challenges posed by the problem of mental 
causation: 
 
One sort of reaction on the part of some philosophers to the re-
emergence of mental causation as a philosophical problem is to try to 
dissipate it by arguing that there is in fact no such “problem”… It has 
been argued that worries about mental causation arise out of our 
misplaced philosophical priorities; that overindulgence in unmotivated 
metaphysical assumptions and arguments is the source of the 
unnecessary worries; that a misunderstanding of the logic and 
metaphysics of causation is at the core of the apparent troubles; that 
we should look to explanations and explanatory practices, not to 
metaphysics, for guidance on the matter of mental causation… 
These are what we might call “free lunch” solutions – or, if not free, at 
least pretty cheap ones.24 
 
It is the association of 1960s style non-reductivism with an intensionalist view 
of causation, rather than its inability to account for the distinction between 
reasons why and reasons for, that is troublesome for Kim, Lepore, Lower and 
others. But if 1960s style non-reductivism has been scorned primarily on 
account of its unwillingness to distinguish between causation and causal 
explanation, rather than on account of its alleged inability to make the 
distinction between reasons why and reasons for, the meta-philosophical 
burden of proof lies with the causalist. We are owed an argument which 
explains why it is worth living with the problem of explanatory exclusion and 
blurring the boundaries between logic and psychology in order to introduce 
                                                 
23
 Lepore, E., and B. Lower, “More on Making Mind Matter” Philosophical Topics XVII (1), pp. 
175-191, 1989. 
24
 Kim, J., Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998, p. 59. 
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the distinction between causation and causal explanation required by a 
revisionary conception of metaphysics. 
To summarize: why is it that causalism became the new orthodoxy in 
the philosophy of action? The official story is that Davidson’s master argument 
conclusively showed that severing the link between non-reductivism and anti-
causalism was necessary in order to explain the distinction between reasons 
why and reasons for. The suggestion made here is that Davidson’s argument 
succeeded not because it spelled out, in a quasi-transcendental fashion, the 
necessary c nditions for making a distinction between the reasons that 
motivated an agent from other reasons, but because its message chimed with 
a return of a revisionary conception of metaphysics and the view that 
causation cannot be a mere form of explanation. If so, the first order 
philosophical battle between causalists and non-causalists in the philosophy 
of action cannot be won without fighting a meta-philosophical war about the 
very role and character of philosophical analysis. And fighting this war should 
involve much more than dismissing 1960s style non-reductivism as belonging 
to the era of little red books and their proponents as seeking a free ontological 
lunch. Since what distinguishes philosophy from other forms of enquiry is the 
fact that reflection on the nature of philosophy is an intrinsic part of philosophy 
itself, not a distinct second-order discipline,25 the identification of metaphysics 
with an ontological investigation into mind-independent structures cannot 
simply be taken for granted. And if meta-philosophy is an intrinsic part of 
philosophy, the question concerning the nature of philosophical problems - 
are they conceptual or are they ontological? - is itself a proper object of 
philosophical discussion. The endorsement of a particular conception of 
philosophical enquiry, in other words, cannot be deemed to be philosophically 
non-negotiable. Yet, it is precisely a tendency to take a particular conception 
of the role and character of philosophical analysis as read that is largely 
responsible for the success of causalism. 
                                                 
25
 Tugendhat, E. (1976), Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P Garner, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
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